The Total Volunteer Force (TVF) will restructure the U.S. military's personnel system, designed to overhaul the inflexible, centrally-managed structure today. Building on the entrepreneurial spirit of the all volunteer force (AVF) transformation in 1973, the TVF takes the next evolutionary step toward volunteerism in all aspects of Human Resource operations.
The U.S. military employs roughly 1.4 million uniformed officers and enlistees, volunteers all. These are some of the most talented, entrepreneurial leaders in the world, yet surveys show they are intensely dissatisfied with what is viewed as a dysfunctional personnel system. While each case is, of course, an individual one, there are five core personnel issues that seem to cause the majority of the dissatisfaction: (1) personnel matters are centrally planned and managed by Human Resources Command (HRC) in the Army, which is based at Fort Knox, Kentucky, and similar organazation for the other services; (2) promotions are constrained by seniority rules and made arbirtary by career box-checking with excessively frequent rotations from one position to the next; (3) compensation is almost entirely merit free; (4) assignments do not match jobs with officers very well; and (5) evaluations are ineffective in giving feedback or assessing skills, with no input from peers and subordinates.
The U.S. military’s personnel system is structurally inefficient to such an extreme that all branches are suffering from loss and misuse of critical personnel, seriously harming national security. The size of this issue is large in dollar terms as well, with $34.5 billion of expenditures on officer pay and allowances in the FY2013 DOD budget, and $75.2 billion on enlisted.
During what amounted to a farewell address, Secretary of Defense Robert Gates asked the assembled cadets of West Point how the Army “can break up the institutional concrete, its bureaucratic rigidity in its assignments and promotion processes, in order to retain, challenge, and inspire its best, brightest, and most-battled tested young officers to lead the service in the future?” He further warned that the “greatest challenge facing your Army, and frankly, my main worry” is the “personnel bureaucracy that awaits ... often cited as [one of the] primary factors causing promising officers to leave the Army just as they are best positioned to have a positive impact on the institution.”
Of particular concern is the issue of job-matching. At it now stands, using the Army as an example, the G-1 is responsible for the development, management, and execution of all manpower and personnel plans, programs, and policies throughout the US army. The plans are executed by HRC. While HRC does it's best to match servicemen and women with appropriate jobs, the vast size and scope of the task renders the centralized process inefficient with a huge degree of skill and job mismatch. To solve the problem of limited information about troops, for example, the HRC relies on performance evaluatons from available officers, which are badly overinflated and widely ridiculed. Such assessments can hardly be expected to do an ideal- even adequate- job of sorting troops.
Furthermore, although officers are asked to provide ranked lists of location preferences for new assignments, it is frequently the case that they wind up with their least preferential option. Since trading is not allowed, they then frequently face the decision of taking a highly undesirable position, or leaving the military altogether. Unfortunately, the latter often turns out to be the case.
Consider the results of a recent study of West Point graduates conducted by Tim Kane:
Only one-fifth of active-duty respondents (18 percent) think the military does a good job matching talents with jobs, and the same number thinks the army is weeding out the weakest leaders. The final option asks whether the personnel system should be radically reformed, something we asked as a contrast with common calls for incremental change, and 55 percent of respondents agree.
It was seen that 78 percent of all respondents (and 78 percent of active-duty respondents) agree that the current exit rate of the best officers harms national security, while 65 percent (68 percent among active duty) agree that it leads to a less competent general officer corps. (Kane, Bleeding Talent, 98)
Consider the response to one representative question copied below:
Which of the following statements do you agree with? (check all that apply). The current military personnel system...
|
Percent |
Active Duty Percent |
|
|
... does a good job weeding out the weakest leaders. |
26% |
18% |
|
... does a good job retaining the best leaders. |
6% |
5% |
|
... does a good job matching talents with jobs. |
16% |
18% |
|
... does a good job promoting the right officers to general. |
28% |
38% |
|
... promotes & incentivizes entrepreneurial leaders. |
5% |
8% |
|
... should be radically reformed. |
55% |
55% |
The Total Volunteer Force (TVF) is a concept that will fundamentally restructure the military's personnel system, designed to overhaul the inflexible, centrally-managed structure in place in all service branches in the form of, for example, the 4000-person Human Resources Command at Fort Knox. Building on the entrepreneurial spirit of the military's transofrmation to an all volunteer force (AVF) in 1973 - vindicated over time the bedrock of a the current high quality of manpower in uniform - the TVF proposes to take the next evolutionary step toward volunteerism in all aspects on HR. The TVF is not a temporary, band-aid solution to a specific issue (ie spending more money on talent retention with a one-time bonus), but rather a fundamental restructure of the military's personnel system.
Central changes include creating an internal labor market for job assignments and promotions, ending the use of year groups and silos that define people in terms that make them centrally manageable cogs. The TVF fundamentally creates an internal labor market instead of filtering supply (workforce) and demand (commanders) through a central coordinator (Human Resources Command) -- HRC is broken up and removed from the job-matching and promotion authority. Included in the TVF is a restructure of the retirement system, whereby a new pension system would drop the present 20-year cliff in favor of a defined contribution, which again removes monetary coercion from the system. While creating an internal labor market sounds like a complicated and expensive undertaking, it is in practicality exactly the opposite. Markets naturally form when there are no barriers in place, so the most central change required to create an internal labor market would be to remove the hiring authority that presently acts as a barrier. In fact, if we think of the core TVF solution as a singular reform, it is simply a devolution of hiring authority.
Though it may seem that the creation of an internal labor market would terminate the need for central planners at HRC, it's important to note that it would actually increase the need for HR talent. By implementing an internal labor maket, TVF could disband personnel command centers such as HRC and reorient personnel staffers to become counselors. Each division, brigade, and battalion would have at least one HR officer (HRO)- a peer with the XO- who would be responsible for soliciting and screening candidates for the commander to select to join the unit. The HRO would also give career guidance to officers and NCOs long before they leave the unit. Unstead of being a faceless and feared voice at Fort Know, HR professional would become flesh and blood mentors.
An internal labor market would also give commanders ultimate authority to hire (and remove) individual officers and enlistees. TVF management will trust individual soldiers to manage their careers while also trusting commanders to make hiring decisions, utilizing a more flexible approach to matching talent and open positons. Such a revolutionary change would shift entirely the nature of supply and demand in the labor pool of military talent. It shifts, for example, how officers operate -- no longer trying to follow a "golden path" of the orthodox but by specializing as they see fit and as the "market" rewards. Unit commanders would be much more sensitive to new strategic needs, for example, and would move to hire, reward, and promote young officers with cyber skills instead of the one-size-fits all template of infantry command that the current Army necessitates for career advancement. From this one change, others flow, namely the freedom to let volunteers truly volunteer.
A related aspect is a transformation in force structure planning. The TVF solution to manning a 1.4 million strong workforce is to allow greater flexibility between ranks (year groups), occupational silos, and even active duty status. For example, current rules bar veterans employed in the civilian sector from re-joining as a rule, even if they have rare and critical skills. Not so in the TVF. Nor would the TVF require incompetent or burned out officers to remain in uniform or alternatively, to force out competent officers during drawdowns. Too often the military drawdown has been enacted by offering quit bonuses, taken up by some of the best officers leaving the mediocre in place. An internal job market will automatically right size the work force, as it does in private sector organizations.
In 2012, the Department of Defense spent over $110 billion on personnel costs, including $1 billion on so-called "separation pay" paid to officers and enlisted servicemen and women for early retirement. Additionally, over $4.5 billion was spent on "incentive" and "special pays" for officers and enlisted troops.
Under the Total Volunteer Force, market mechanisms would be used to more innately match troops to positions and better structure retirement programs, therefore reducing the amount of money the DOD spends on personnel costs. If separation, incentive, and special pays were each reduced by as little as a quarter, the DOD would save up to $1 billion dollars. Many more billions would be saved by lowering the frequency of rotations. And in reality, the TVF is likely to reduce costs much more drastically by reducing the need for financial incentives like separation, incentive, and special pay.
In addition to reducing costs, the TVF will be to enhance unit cohesion, learning, and workforce satisfaction. Talent will gravitate to its optimal equilibrium and national security will be greatly enhanced. As one example, less job rotation would lead to stronger, smarter combat units, fewer fatalities, and more mission success.
As a second example, consider the words of General Philip M. Breedlove, Air Force vice chief of staff, in late 2011, when discussing the requirements of drone missions. "Our No. 1 manning problem in the Air Force is manning our unmanned problems," Breedlow quipped. He further explained that the central challenge he faces with regard to drone missions is imagery analysis, because the capacity to handle the flood of raw intelligence dwarfs the available workforce. In other words, the air force is struggling with management—how best to rapidly adapt its mix of people from one area to the next as needed to keep pace with an ever-shifting array of problems. As the Los Angeles Times reported in 2011: "The Air Force is short of ground-based pilots and crews to fly the drones, intelligence analysts to scrutinize nonstop video and surveillance feeds, and technicians and mechanics to maintain the heavily used aircraft."
If we think about how best to solve the problem above, it becomes apparent that doing so under the present system is next to impossible. With centrally planned and managed HR, rigid career paths, and little room for innovation or flexibility, the present bureaucracy seems more likely to exacerbate Breedlow's issue by creating bottlenecks and red tape rather than solve it. Sure enough, this has proven to be the case. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates became a strong advocate of UAVs (unmanned aerial vehicles) early in his tenure based purely on their performance in Iraq and Afghanistan. Unfortunately, he felt the air force was dragging its feet in producing more assets to perform the recon and combat missions. He wanted to double and eventually quadruple the number of CAPS (combat air patrols)—there were less than a dozen in the skies of Iraq at the time—and ultimately fired the top air force leaders because of their reluctance to make the needed changes. Four years after the Gates firings, Michael Donley, the current secretary of the air force, conceded to reporters that its undersupply of necessary personnel caused it to pull back from growing the UAV mission regardless of demand. In February 2012, the USAF made a surprising announcement to scale back drone acquisitions to a target of 65 CAPs. The reason, as Donley made clear in his April 2012 announcement, is that the USAD simply doesn't have the analytical capacity to meet demand The unstated reason is that the USAF doesn't have a dynamic workforce system with the ability to scale accordingly. In short, the DOPMA-driven system was—and is—unprepared for the current labor demand for just about every kind of job associated with unmanend vehicles.
In contrast, if the Air Force Personnel Center (AFPC) were using the Total Volunteer Force approach, with its greater flexibility for hiring and occupational specialization, there would be no bottleneck. The internal labor market would not be bogged down by a central command system, and could react much more quickly to the rapid technological changes and shifting mission requirements outlined above. While it may not have entirely solved the issue, it's fair to say the TVF could have done far more to meet the needs expressed by General Breedlove and Secretary Gates than the present HR system used by USAF.
More broadly, consider the following point: no matter how many smart, well-intentioned, change-oriented personnel officers are assigned to manage the careers of air force personnel corps, they cannot anticipate the labor demand or labor supply of the UAV workforce in three years, let alone ten years. They cannot know the operational demands of the next defense secretary or commander in chief. The exact same dilemma faces the army, navy, and Marine Corps. The TVF is best prepared to meet this uncertain future, helping the military remain agile and innovative in years to come.
The military's conservative nature lends a natural resistance to embracing change, particularly large changes of the size and scope suggested by the Total Volunteer Force. An additional challenge lies in the fact that it's not immediately clear where the impetus for change must come from. While it may be the case that many of the officers in the military are aware of the present personnel issues, the rigid hierarchical structure leaves them unable to implement the changes they know are needed.
Furthermore, there exists the broader challenge of moving from a culture of top-down, rigid hierarchy to a more flexible, natural hierarchy—one that cultivates and promotes entrepreneurial leaders and contributors rather than those that work the system. While the stakes are perhaps higher in this case (failure on this front represents not only organizational inefficiency and dissatisfaction for troops, but also potentially compromises national security), the core of the problem is non-unique to those in the military sphere. Many, if not all, business leaders face these issues at some point in their organization's life cycle, making this a problem well-suited to the Leaders Everywhere Challenge.
Overcoming these challenges today to institute the TVF will require distinct efforts from the part of multiple actors, among them the Presidential administration, Congress, and military leaders. It is important that clear, actionable steps are outlined for each stakeholder, such that each knows why and how their contributions to TVF are important. In addition to actionable steps, moving these key stakeholders will require clear evidence as to how the TVF is superior to the existing system. As a starting point, much of this evidence can come from Kane's Bleeding Talent and other contemporary studies (see sources below). Furthermore, expressions of support for TVF from several key stakeholders—perhaps members of Congress and prominent military brass—would go a long way in helping to legitimize the concept and ultimately turn the tide on contemporary thinking.
The challenges above are not without precedent- when President Nixon sought to implement an all volunteer force in the 1970's, he faced staunch opposition from a variety of actors, and a military culture that was arguably far more rigid than exists today. Yet he remained persistent in pushing for change, and was ultimately successful in implementing the all volunteer force. Clearly, then, changes of this magnitude are possible.
Even if complete change is not possible right away, there are clear first steps that may be taken to begin implementation of the TVF and demonstrate its effectiveness to key stakeholders. As a first step, the amy should authorize commanders to do hiring directly, allowing them to use their firsthand knowledge and experience to ensure that troops are better suited to their placements and positions. HRC should shift to an advisory role, leaving the military commanders to actually command.
Another first step would be to begin an overhaul of the dated retirement system as described above. To ease the transition for those attached to the present, 20-year vesting system, the military could offer the option for existing troops to stick with the present system if it's more preferable to them. Phasing in other changes in this manner would minimize disruption and help ensure a smooth transition. Additionally, a phased transition could offer a natural test, allowing the military to better understand the benefits of the TVF on troop retention, satisfaction, cost savings, and other metrics by comparing between those who opted in and those who did not.
This submission to the MIX is submitted by Tim Kane, Elizabeth DeMeo, and Nico Zavaleta
REFERENCES
Coumbe, Arthur T. “Army Officer Development: Historical Context.” Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 2010.
Defense Science Board, Reports: http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/reports2000s.htm.
Falk, Sayce, and Sasha Rogers. “Junior Military Officer Retention: Challenges and Opportunities.” John F. Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, March 2011. http://www.foreignpolicy.com/files/fp_uploaded_documents/Falk-Rogers%20PAE%2003-11%20vF.pdf/.
Kane, Tim. Bleeding Talent, How the US Military Mismanages Great Leaders and Why It's Time for a Revolution. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2012
US Government Accountability Office. “Military Personnel: Strategic Plan Needed to Address Army’s Emerging Officer Accession and Retention Challenges.” GAO-07–224. January 19, 2007. http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07224.pdf.
Wardynski, Casey, David S. Lyle, and Michael J. Colarusso. “Towards a U.S. Army Officer Corps Strategy for Success: Retaining Talent.,” Strategic Studies Institute., U.S. Army War College, January 2010. http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/display.cfm?pubID=965.
REVIEWS
· New York Times, Fred Andrews, Jan. 5, 2013
· Forbes, Susan Adams, Jan. 8, 2013
· National Review, Veronique de Rugy, Jan. 8, 2013
· National Review, Reihan Salam, Jan. 9, 2013
INTERVIEWS
· National Public Radio, “On Point” with Tom Ashbrook,
· Time, Battleland Blog Q&A, Jan. 21, 2013
· WNYC, radio show with Brian Lehrer, Jan. 3, 2013
BY TIM KANE
· Washington Post, “How to lose great leaders? Ask the Army,” Feb. 15, 2013
· Foreign Policy, “An Army of None,” Jan. 10, 2013
· The Atlantic, “Why Our Best Officers Are Leaving,” Jan/Feb 2011
· Harvard Business Review, “Bleeding Talent,” Nov. 17, 2010
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